Mali: Five Principles to Guide U.S. Policy Towards Mali

Displaced women prepare food at an informal camp in Bagoundié, Mali.
27 April 2023
guest column

For over a decade, Mali has struggled with violence, coups, deteriorating human rights and declining democratic credibility. Multiple sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies designed to press for reform seem to have had the opposite effect.

We are therefore deeply disheartened by the prospect of U.S. policy deepening the estrangement with Mali. Despite the real challenges wrought by the multitude of actors in the country, it is critical to remain engaged in Mali as the country manages its transition, security apparatus, and interstate relationships.

While the Malian government continues to search for international partners, the United States must not relinquish its influence at this critical time.

Now is not the time to isolate Mali, for isolation risks pushing that country further toward a system that is void of civilian-centered democratic values and governmental accountability.

To ensure the wellbeing and shared prosperity of all Malian citizens no matter their location, U.S. foreign policy toward Mali must take on the following five principles. These principles outline - based on our firsthand experiences - the most effective and meaningful ways of engaging in foreign policy in the country:

People-centered approaches

U.S. foreign policy must reorient to place the wellbeing of the Malian people at the heart of policy considerations and goals. Centering the Malian people in policy must hinge on open dialogues and a multi-level shared understanding.

The Malian people must not be sacrificed in a bid to punish those in power.

Citizens already face compounding - and worsening - crises whose mitigation is reliant on external assistance, much of which comes from the United States. Livelihoods, climate adaptation, social cohesion, and food security will all suffer with a withdrawal of U.S. foreign assistance and isolation of Mali from world economic markets, forcing the people to suffer for the faults of their representatives.

We have seen sanctions and isolationist tactics backfire in the Mali context before. Further entrenching Mali’s isolation will lead directly to human losses on the ground. It is critical that policy decisions concerning Mali recognize the outsized impact U.S. action has on innocent civilians, and adapt accordingly to ensure our actions truly align with a no harm framework by centering Malians and their needs.

Independent U.S. leadership for peace

The situation in Mali demands independent action that leverages American influence and perspectives. The United States is uniquely positioned to provide leadership in Mali - and across the region - given the long history and the colonial baggage that pervades European relationships with the country.

Allowing European foreign policy to overshadow bilateral relations further isolates the United States from francophone African countries that are looking for an alternative to Europe, and particularly France. As Mali seeks new partners and European allies reorient themselves in the region, the U.S. government must offer a different partnership opportunity than other great powers in the region.

Shared history, shared future

The American and Malian peoples are inextricably linked by a strong history of immigration and cultural exchange, with the first Malians coming to the United States in the 17th century through the transatlantic slave trade. Malian communities in this country actively engage in political and social issues and organize festivals, celebrations, and exhibitions displaying both Malian and Malian-American culture. We owe the Malian people a foreign policy structure that reflects these enduring people-to-people connections.

Peace, prosperity, and inclusive governance

American policy must prioritize the wellbeing of local citizens through the advancement of peace, prosperity and inclusive governance. All U.S. actions in Mali should therefore contribute to these aims. Washington must make it clear that despite the political instability, violent extremism, and economic disparity faced in Mali, the United States will continue to be an active partner in the country's development. Isolating Mali at this critical juncture will send the opposite message to Mali and others in the region.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

  1. Maintain diplomatic relations with Mali. The United States government should not cut off communication with and aid for the Malian government and people, nor should it impose sanctions or other forms of economic punishment on the country. Maintaining dialogue with the Malian government is the most effective way of influencing policy and ensuring that a democratic transition is realized. Moreover, imposing sanctions and cutting off aid will only hurt the Malian people, and will not reliably lead to changes in the government’s behavior.
  2. Provide election assistance and institutional capacity building to the Malian government. The upcoming Malian elections will be critical benchmarks in the country’s transition back to democratic rule; however, government insiders have indicated alarm at the country’s capacity to effectively hold these elections. In order to better ensure the democratic transition in Mali, the U.S. should bolster the capacity of the Electoral Commission and provide technical support on constitutional reviews. This assistance should sustainably build the capacities of the Commission to conduct this and future elections through the provision of equipment, training, deployment of observers, and civic education campaigns.
  3. Prioritize stabilization, the protection of human rights, and rule of law in Mali. The security situation in Mali is currently bad and deteriorating. Not only does increasing violence against civilians impact Mali’s capacity for development, but it also has significant implications for the stability of West Africa broadly, which is already experiencing spillover effects from violent extremism and instability.Promoting human rights and rule of law is a critical piece of improving the security situation, for barriers to justice and unaddressed and ongoing human rights abuses fuel grievances that push individuals toward violence. Stopping programming that addresses these root drivers of conflict will leave many civilians in the lurch and will undermine other peace efforts.
  4. Collaborate with the Malian government to provide reliable security alternatives. The United States government is correct in its condemnation of the Wagner Group and the Malian government’s partnership with it, yet support for reliable alternatives remains critical. The U.S. should leverage its position in the Security Council to continue to broker dialogue between the Malian government and the UN.Moreover, by funding projects that address the root drivers of conflict in the country, building livelihoods, and improving the standard of living of everyday citizens, the United States can further undermine the push and pull factors that drive insecurity and violent extremism in the country.
  5. Center economic livelihood within Mali’s international investment. After the economic sanctions by ECOWAS in 2022, Mali’s inflation and cost of living skyrocketed, negatively affecting the lives of its citizens rather than punishing coup leaders. Since the lifting of ECOWAS sanctions, Mali’s inflation has declined from 13.9% in August of 2022, to 5.9% in February 2023. As noted in many other contexts, a lack of economic livelihood can be a direct driver of instability and conflict. The United States should focus its strategic partnership with Mali on economic and technical financial support. By working with the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), the American government can supply key economic interventions that address poverty and economic livelihood throughout the country. Alleviating the economic burden on citizens will allow Mali to focus on internal governance, constitutional reforms, and elections. Restoring Mali’s AGOA status could be a major step in the right direction.

Just as with Ukraine, the Biden-Harris administration must maintain American commitments to Mali and its citizens. The Sahel is confronted by a multitude of concurrent issues. Further isolating Mali will have unintended consequences and contribute to growing instability in the region, the drastic economic downturn, and Mali’s deteriorating geopolitical relationship with the West. Removing U.S. influence and ceding key relationships to great powers like Russia and China would be a drastic mistake.

Chic Dambach is President Emeritus of the National Peace Corps Association; former President of the Alliance for Peacebuilding, and former Chief of Staff for Congressman John Garamendi. He is an adjunct faculty member at Johns Hopkins and American Universities, and he is a Woodrow Wilson Visiting Fellow.

Vivian Lowery Derryck , founder and president emerita of The Bridges Institute, former president of the Africa-America Institute and former USAID Assistant Administrator for Africa, has worked to strengthen Mali’s democracy since 1989. Responding to the 2012 coup, she launched Mali Watch, followed by Mali Moving Forward and the Mali Affinity Group.  In 2021 she and the two co-authors were named Knights of the National Order of Mali, the highest honor awarded to a foreign national.

Mel is Founder and President of the Constituency for Africa, (CFA), a 32-years old Washington, D.C. based not-for-profit organization that advocates for Africa in the United States and throughout the Diaspora. He also operates a private consulting practice, Africa Advisory Services, LLC, which works with clients to support a range of business initiatives in Africa, and helps African clients to address issues in the United States.

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